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The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
defines an island as “a naturally formed area of land, surrounded 
by water, which is above water at high tide”.1 However, according to 
this international law, not every kind of island engenders the same 
legal effects, for “Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or 
economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone.”2 
The primary purpose of this paragraph was to ensure that insignificant 
geological features, particularly those far from areas claimed by other 
states, could not generate broad zones of national jurisdiction in the 
middle of the ocean. Otherwise, the smallest rock would be capable of 
suddenly generating an enormous exclusive economic zone, a circular 
area with a radius of 200 nautical miles or 370 kilometres, i.e. an area 
of roughly two thirds the size of France.
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In fact, there have been few circumstances in which rocks have 
given rise to such claims. Most often, these have been located in 
coastal areas subject to conflicting state claims. However, there is an 
interesting, utterly isolated case: that of a rock, or actually two rocks, 
in the middle of the western part of the Pacific Ocean known as the 
Philippine Sea. The first of the rocks is barely the size of a small room, 
and the second, that of a twin bed. At high tide, the smallest pokes 
some seven centimetres out of the ocean, while the bigger one reaches 
twice this height. They are part of a submerged reef formation that 
is about 4.5 kilometres long and less than 2 kilometres wide called 
Okinotorishima which is located 1,740 kilometres south of Tokyo and 
a thousand or so kilometres away from the nearest Japanese islands. 
These geological features are defined by the Chinese as rocks and 
by the Japanese as islands. Behind the linguistic disagreement, as 
the UNCLOS definition of an island makes clear, lies an economic 
and strategic one: if considered an “island”, Okinotori’s nine square 
metres of solid rock would allow the establishment of an exclusive 
economic zone measuring approximately 430,000 square kilometres – 
slightly more than the total surface area of Japan. It makes the claim 
to Okinotori a unique territorial issue, for this is not a case in which 
countries struggle for control of a territory. There is no chance that 
China would obtain territorial rights in the Okinotorishima dispute. 
The heart of this quarrel is the question of whether Japan can maintain 
its claim to an exclusive economic zone either by linguistically defining 
the unmanned rocks as islands or, as I will shortly explain, by growing 
them into “a naturally formed area of land” that can “sustain human 
habitation or economic life”.
Originally named the Douglas Reef after the British naval officer 
William Douglas discovered it is 1789, the atoll, which at the time 
amounted to a handful of rocks or islets uninhabitable by humans, was 
long ignored by imperial powers. This all changed in the early 1920s, when 
the Japanese navy began surveying the seas south-west of Okinawa and 
the Ogasawara Islands. In 1931, after confirming that no other countries 
had laid claim to it, Japan declared the reef Japanese territory, placed 
it under the jurisdiction of the City of Tokyo as part of the Ogasawara 
Islands, and gave it a new Japanese name: Okinotorishima, or “remote 
bird island”. Though it was debatable even then whether a coral reef could 
be claimed as territory from the viewpoint of the international law, the 
government decided to “make [the question] a fait accompli by claiming 
it”.3 No country officially made any objection to the inclusion.
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While the Imperial Navy had ambitions to transform what at that 
point were five rocks jutting out of the Philippine Sea into a hydroplane 
base, the government decided to refer to the base in international 
communications as a lighthouse and a meteorological observation 
site. By 1941, the foundations for the buildings were completed. 
Construction, however, was interrupted by the outbreak of the Pacific 
War. After the war, Japan lost sovereignty over the Ogasawara Islands, 
including Okinotorishima, until they were returned to them in 1968 
by the U.S. The territorial possession of Okinotorishima did not 
attract much attention until the late 1970s, when nations started to 
claim their exclusive economic zones. In 1983, when Japan signed the 
UNCLOS (which took effect for most nations in 1994, but for Japan 
in 1996), the Japanese started to realize that their territorial claims 
could evaporate together with Okinotorishima’s two remaining 
rocks, which were disappearing due to rising sea levels and the 
constant pounding of waves during the typhoon season. In order to 
stop the physical erosion of Okinotorishima, the City of Tokyo, and 
later the central government, carried out protective efforts from 
1987 to 1993 by building steel breakwaters and concrete walls, and 
by having helicopters carefully drop tetrapods around the rocks. In 
1988 an artificial structure was erected on the reef next to the rocks 
to house the facilities of the Japan Marine Science and Technology 
Centre. In the same year, American law professor Jon Van Dyke wrote 
that “the more than 200 million dollars the Japanese are spending 
to construct what is in essence an artificial island cannot . . . be the 
basis for a claim to the exclusive control over the resources in the 
waters around such a construction”.4 Van Dyke’s academic opinion 
was in line with the Chinese political one, which was expressed 
later, and with growing insistence, during bilateral talks in Beijing 
in April 2004. Although China has no basis for laying claim to the 
rocks, it does have a military interest in keeping them from being 
declared part of Japanese territorial seas, because they are situated 
midway between Taiwan and Guam, a U.S. territory in the Pacific: the 
rocks would be located along the ideal route that an American fleet, 
including submarines, would take in the event of American military 
engagement with China to support Taiwan. Were such a situation to 
arise, the People’s Republic might well want to place its submarines 
in the area in order to delay the arrival of U.S. Navy vessels without 
being annoyed by what would have been, until then, an essentially 
pro-Taiwan Japan.
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China’s challenging of Japan’s territorial right to Okinotorishima 
led to a resurgence in nationalism in Japan as well as some vigorous 
reactions: in May 2005, Shintaro Ishihara, the nationalist Governor of 
Tokyo, rushed to the rocks, raised the Japanese flag on the largest one, 
mounted an address plaque reading “One Okinotori Island, Ogasawara 
Village, Tokyo” and had a 330-million-yen (three-million-euro) radar 
surveillance system installed.5 With his actions, Ishihara asserted 
that recently developed international law could not repudiate the 
past investments Japan had made in Okinotorishima and that Tokyo 
had a legitimate claim over it. In an essay appearing in the Sankei 
Shimbun on June 6, he said that Japan had been spending money 
on Okinotorishima for future development since 1932, including 
the investment of 85 billion yen (approximately 770 million euros) in 
building and maintaining a residence.6 According to the governor, these 
were historical facts that could not be reversed by the UN convention. 
Moreover, he argued, it was Japan’s responsibility to hold the area 
and establish effective control over the surrounding waters through 
economic activities such as fishing in order not to allow the Chinese 
to develop the area into a base for submarines.
Japan’s claim to this rock is not unique. In a decades-long dispute 
with Ireland, Iceland and Denmark, Britain has been seeking UN 
recognition of its rights to the seabed – and to the oil beneath it – 
around Rockall, an uninhabited granite outcrop measuring 31 by 25 
metres located halfway between Ireland and Iceland. South Korea, for 
its part, has been involved in a conflict with Japan that has stretched 
on since the end of World War II but intensified after 1996, the year in 
which the UNCLOS took effect, and has renamed the Liancourt Rocks 
“Dokdo”, or “solitary island”, and is planning to double the number 
of resident households on the rock from one to two couples, to plant 
trees in order to develop “a forest”, and to secure an adequate supply 
of potable water by installing a water purifier.7
While Japan’s claim might not be unique, its solution to the problem 
is. Confronting Van Dyke’s criticism, Tadao Kuribayashi, a professor 
of law at Toyoeiwa University in Tokyo, insists that the Japanese claim 
is justifiable as there is no definition of a “rock” in international 
law. Geologically speaking, he argues, coral reefs and rocks (objects 
consisting of hard continental soil) are different.8 Thus, he argues, 
a country can claim its own exclusive economic zone based on its 
possession of coral reefs. Again, as with the island-versus-rock issue, 
there is more at stake with the difference between rock and coral: over 
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time, rocks are, at best, stable, and are subject to erosion, but coral 
has the potential to grow.
Kuribayashi defended his position in the Report on Promoting 
Economic Activities in Okinotorishima, published by The Nippon 
Foundation (Nippon Dankai). This Japanese private foundation has 
been criticized for advancing right-wing and nationalist goals in 
the deceptive guise of a charity. It has shown a particular interest 
in the disputed rocks as part of its maritime programmes. For the 
preparation of the report it dispatched missions to the “islands” in 
November 2004 and March 2005.9 The first mission was intended to 
investigate the ways in which the exclusive economic zone could be 
used, and its participants included experts in the fields of international 
law, and coral reef ecology and construction. The suggestions put 
forward in their report included the erection of a lighthouse, the 
cultivation of the existing coral reef and the development of an 
artificial one and the building of the social infrastructure necessary 
to sustaining human habitation. Once it bore a lighthouse, the island 
would be added to the charts around the globe as Okinotorishima, 
and the awareness of its presence would be enhanced. The breeding of 
the coral reef and sand by various means, such as planting glauconite 
and foraminifera (hard-shelled microscopic organisms whose bodies 
become sand as they die), was important as a means of enlarging the 
“island” due to the trend of rising sea levels that has resulted from 
global warming.
According to the New York Times, by 2005 the Japanese government 
had spent over 600 million dollars, or 500 euros, to keep the barren 
islets above water. It had encased the tiny protrusions in 25-metre-
thick concrete that was 60 metres in diameter at a cost of 200 million 
euros, and had then cut slits in the concrete so that the “island” 
would comply with the UN law that “a naturally formed area of 
land” be “surrounded by water”. The smaller one got a 40-million-
euro titanium net to shield it from being chipped away at by wave-
hurled debris.10 Since then, Japanese scientists have been developing 
genetically modified species of coral with the aim of expanding 
the rocks into a small but internationally recognized archipelago: 
the Okinotori Islands. China, however, has criticized the Japanese 
government for planting coral, saying that the action runs counter 
to international conventions. Japanese officials, for their part, have 
confirmed that Japan had begun planting coral on Okinotori as part 
of a three-million-euro project to defend its territory.11
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Science and construction are the keys to solidifying Japan’s 
ownership of the atoll. Concrete is the visible marker of Japan’s 
sustained claim to Okinotori. However, most of the “island-making” 
is being done off site and out of sight. With the support of the wealthy 
Nippon Foundation, the Tokyo Metropolitan Government has tried 
to speed up the rate of coral accumulation on Okinotori through the 
cultivation of coral polyps in Tokyo and their transplant to Okinotori 
for the purpose of creating a surface area that can “sustain human 
habitation”. The first of these transplants was carried out in 2007. The 
government intends to graft millions of coral fragments, which are 
netted together, not only to save the two small islets that poke out of 
the water during high tide, but also to produce even more land area 
above sea level.
This is not Japan’s first foray into making artificial islands. The 
tradition goes back to the creation of Dejima, a man-made island 
built in Nagasaki Bay in 1634. The island served to house Portuguese 
and then Dutch merchants as part of a shogun strategy to keep Japan 
culturally isolated while still permitting some trade. With an area of 
120 by 75 metres, the fan-shaped island was administratively part of 
Nagasaki but autonomous in many other ways. Heavily controlled, 
it hosted, at some point in time, residences for twenty Dutchmen, 
warehouses and accommodations for Japanese officials.
The Okinotori project is also not Japan’s first attempt to build 
artificial reefs. The first on record in Japan were built out of bamboo in 
the 1800s. Since the early 1950s Japanese marine fishery interests have 
been investigating the use of artificial reefs for the manipulation of fish 
populations by utilizing concrete riprap, natural stone, bricks and a 
plethora of other materials. All too often these installations furnished 
a welcome excuse to discard unwanted refuse like automobile tires, 
cars, ships, planes, streetcars, tanks and even offshore platforms 
(“rigs for reefs”) for economic gain with little or no regard for marine 
ecology. In the 1960s and ’70s, power companies even sponsored 
research for the utilization of highly toxic fly ash in artificial reef 
components.12 None of these methods, however, would easily qualify 
as “natural growth”.
Over the last fifteen years, several companies that market structures 
for artificial reef building have popped up, including ReefBalls, 
Grouper Ghettos, Ecoreefs, Eco-Coral and Biorock. The most advanced 
techniques used by the Japanese are genetically modified species 
of coral and a technology developed by Biorock called “mineral 
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accretion”, which uses electricity to “grow” limestone rock on artificial 
reef frames and thus increases the growth rates of corals and other 
reef organisms.13 A wide range of organisms on or near the growing 
substrate is affected by electrochemically altered conditions, which 
shift growth rates. According to the developers of Biorock, one of whom 
is the German-born architect and marine scientist Wolf Hilbertz, 
“reefs of any configuration and size can be grown for purposes of reef 
restoration and shore protection”.14 Although originally carried out 
on a small scale, recent projects include developing reefs of up to 630 
metres in length and up to 20 metres in width. For Hilbertz and his 
partner Goreau, their work serves as the basis for a new profession: 
seascape architecture, which they present as the younger sibling of 
landscape architecture.
In an era of rising sea levels, and with many reefs and small atoll 
nation-states at risk of being submerged by this phenomenon, island-
growing techniques and advanced coral cultivation technologies might 
become a flourishing business. Moreover, the Japanese government is 
adroitly turning its costly investments in these technologies into a form 
of environmental diplomacy. The Tokyo Metropolitan Government and 
the Nippon Foundation are promoting their efforts in island-growing 
as a means of overcoming environmental disaster. Yet for Japan, the 
key issue will be if it succeeds in growing coral fast enough to outpace 
rising sea levels. The Chinese might simply need to wait. Their large-
scale turn to driving cars, using more appliances and heating larger 
homes might do the rest.
